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Abstract This paper investigates the effectiveness of two instruments de-
signed to defer termination in the centipede game: an insurance against termi-
nation by the opponent, and an option to offer the opponent a bonus for not
terminating the game. The rational prediction in both cases is passing until close
to the end. Empirically, however, only the bonus option is used by the subjects.
The results indicate that subjects readily understand the strategic effect of the
bonus, which, once offered, renders passing until close to the end the strictly dom-
inant strategy for both players. Yet, they fail to realise the slightly more involved
strategic signal entailed in the insurance, namely that passing until close to the
end is a strictly dominant strategy for an insured player. In order to further
investigate this effect, we propose a simple behavioural model based on level-k
thinking and show that it is largely consistent with the data.
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1 Introduction
Many economic as well as social interactions bear characteristics of a repeated
trust game in that both aggregate and individual welfare can be considerably
increased through repeated (mutual) transfers. Yet, as transfers often are not
enforceable, any such contribution entails the risk of not being reciprocated. Joint
ventures of firms, for example, are typically characterized by repeated investments
or transfers of technological know-how in order to increase the productivity of
the other party. However, at any point in time this leads to an unequal split
of the benefits and there is a permanent risk that transfers are not reciprocated
once they have been obtained. Co-authorship is another example, in particular if
authors alternate in working on a paper. Any effort made by one author further
improves the paper and, hence, benefits both authors. Yet, only one currently
bears the cost.
A convenient strategic representation of such interactions is the centipede
game (Rosenthal, 1981). In this game, players alternately choose whether to ter-
minate the interaction or to pass over to the opponent. Passing always increases
aggregate payoffs. However, if the game is terminated, joint payoffs are split un-
equally with the terminating player getting the larger share of the pie. Since the
game is finite, a standard backwards induction argument yields immediate ter-
mination as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome. However, neither immediate
termination nor passing until close to the end is typically observed in experimen-
tal studies of the centipede game. Rather, in the majority of cases the game is
terminated after about 2/3 of the maximum number of rounds (e.g. McKelvey
and Palfrey, 1992; Nagel and Tang, 1998). Thus, from the perspective of a social
planner, considerable welfare gains are lost, even though the loss is smaller than
predicted by standard theory.
Inspired by these observations, we set out to investigate empirically the ef-
fectiveness of two instruments designed to increase cooperation, i.e. defer termi-
nation, in the centipede game. The first instrument is a costly insurance against
the loss due to termination by the opponent. The purchase of the insurance is
observed by both players prior to the play of the game. The second instrument is
a bonus which players can offer to their opponent (in terms of a binding promise)
for not terminating the game. Both instruments are designed so as to — the-
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oretically — induce passing at least up to the last or next but last node, and
independent of the actual length of the game.
Obviously, the two instruments differ significantly in the way they induce
players to abstain from early termination. The insurance, on the one hand, banks
on a signalling effect: buying the insurance is like credibly announcing that one
is not afraid of termination by the opponent and, therefore, will always pass.1 If
the opponent understands this signal, passing up to his/her last decision node
becomes optimal. The bonus, on the other hand, simply rewards the opponent
for permanent passing and renders it the strictly dominant action for both the
offering player and the recipient of the offer. In both cases, passing until (close to)
the end is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome if the respective option is taken
by at least one of the players. Therefore, in any pure strategy subgame perfect
equilibrium of the extended game, exactly one player should buy the insurance
or offer the bonus, respectively.2
In the laboratory experiment, however, the insurance option fails badly. Only
few subjects insure themselves against termination by the opponent and aggregate
observed play is not significantly different from the standard centipede game
without insurance. By contrast, the opportunities offered by the bonus option
are readily understood and seized. For the vast majority of pairs at least one of
the players offers the bonus when this option is available. In fact, in most cases
the bonus is offered by the first mover, in accordance with the unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium for this game. Accordingly, observed termination is
significantly delayed as compared to the standard centipede game without bonus.
On a general level, the results demonstrate that mechanisms which require
players to recognize that their opponents will not play a strictly dominated strat-
egy (as in case of the bonus) are more effective than mechanisms that rely on
an iteration of this reasoning (as in case of the insurance). This is consistent
with earlier findings showing that subjects avoid dominated strategies but do
not necessarily iterate the dominance reasoning (e.g. Katok, Sefton, and Yavas,
1The only exception to this is the last node, where the insurance has no effect.
2In case of the bonus option, there is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, in which
only the first mover offers the bonus. In case of the insurance, there also is a mixed equilibrium
in which both players purchase the insurance with positive probability.
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2002).3
However, it is also interesting to see whether any further light can be shed
on the specific reasons for the failure of the insurance as compared to the bonus,
especially in view of iterated dominance arguments. In order to do so, we pro-
pose a simple behavioural model which is based on the assumption that subjects
imperfectly analyse the strategic structure of the centipede game and that the
degree of rationality varies among subjects. The type of model considered is
commonly referred to as level-k thinking and is usually used to study initial re-
sponses in normal form games (cf. Stahl and Wilson, 1994 and 1995; Nagel, 1995;
Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt, 1998; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta, 2001;
Crawford and Iriberri, 2007a and 2007b).
Level-k-thinking models are based on the assumption that more sophisticated,
level-k players best respond to the behaviour of level-(k − 1) players, where the
iteration process is anchored in an assumed non-strategic behaviour of the level-0
type, L0. Concerning the behaviour of L0, most approaches assume a uniform
distribution over all available strategies (e.g. Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Crawford
and Iriberri, 2007a). Such a specification is appealing for normal form games
as the “value” of any strategy in these games is hard to assess without think-
ing strategically (with the potential exception of strictly dominated strategies).
But also more refined specifications are used, including (partly) estimated dis-
tributions over available strategies (Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt, 1998) as well as
adjustments in view of the salience of certain actions (Crawford and Iriberri,
2007b). So, as Crawford and Iriberri (2007a, p. 1734) point out, eventually “the
best specification of L0 is an empirical question”.
For the purpose of the current analysis, we assume that the L0-types always
play pass. In case of the centipede game this assumption seems reasonable since
all pass-take decisions appear to be similar if a player does not employ any strate-
gic considerations about her opponent’s behaviour. Hence, as take is costly in
3 Arguably, also framing effects (c.f. Andreoni, 1995) may have had their share in per-
formance difference between the two mechanisms. In particular, the bonus may have been
associated with a positive and the insurance with negative or defensive connotations with the
respective positive (bonus) and negative (insurance) prospects of reciprocation and, accordingly,
consequences for usage frequencies. However, as subjects’ responses to the ex post questionnaire
are not indicative of such effects, we consider them to be comparably weak.
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terms of forgone payoffs, a non-strategic player, L0, can be expected to play pass
at all her decision nodes.
The above “all-pass” assumption for L0 is also convenient in view of the spe-
cific extensive-form structure of the centipede game as it ties the level of thinking
to the steps of iterated backward reasoning. Thus, we can easily differentiate
different levels of iterated backward reasoning within the model. As we aim to
scrutinise the driving forces behind the performance differences between the two
treatment specifications — the insurance and the bonus — this is preferable, for
example, to a crazy types approach (Kreps et al., 1982) as used by McKelvey
and Palfrey (1992), which presumes the existence of fully rational and crazy
types only. In particular, with rational and crazy types only, we would expect
either everyone or no one to purchase the insurance, depending on the behaviour
associated with crazy types. Yet, despite an admittedly infrequent usage of the
insurance, this is not what we observe.
By contrast, observed behaviour in all treatments is largely consistent with our
simple belief based model if, based on data obtained in the standard treatment,
we assume that the majority of agents best-responds to a belief of order at most
1. In that case, only the benefit of the bonus but not the signalling effect of the
insurance can be understood by the majority of the subjects. In fact, in order
to understand the effect of the insurance, a player has to notice that buying
the insurance changes the opponent’s best-response behaviour from take to pass
at least once. This, however, necessitates that the player also considers the
opponent’s awareness of a change in the player’s own best-response behaviour
due to an insurance purchase.4 Thus, it requires at least 2nd-order beliefs, k =
2, which only a minority of subjects seem to hold. By contrast, in the bonus
treatment it is evident for all players with at least 1st-order beliefs that passing is
a dominant strategy for a player who was offered a bonus. Accordingly, given that
few subjects seem to have more than 1st-order beliefs in the standard treatment,
we expect infrequent usage of the insurance and frequent usage of the bonus.
Moreover, as for the second mover the bonus still is unattractive under 1st-order
beliefs (since the opponent is assumed to best-respond to an L0 player and hence
4For an insured player termination at any (if first mover) or any non-terminal node (if second
mover) is strictly dominated.
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always plays pass), we would also expect fewer bonus offers to be made by her.
Both predictions of our behavioural model are consistent with the data.
Summing up, in our view the main contribution of the paper is twofold. First
of all, the experimental data provide further support for the view that (sequen-
tial) mechanisms designed to implement a socially desirable outcome may fail
in practice if they implement this outcome only under rational or higher-order
beliefs as in case of the insurance in the centipede game. In this respect, we
believe that our experiment delivers an important insight for applied mechanism
design. Secondly, apart from these more general aspects, the more detailed analy-
sis in terms of higher-order beliefs not only provides some clues as to the subjects
average level of iterated backward reasoning. It also demonstrates that level-
k-thinking models, if suitably adapted, may contribute to the understanding of
individual behaviour in extensive form games, at least if the respective games are
comparably simple.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe and
analyse the different treatments of our experiment. In Section 3, we report the
data and discuss the results of the experiment. Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
To facilitate the exposition, this section is divided into two parts. In the first
part, 2.1, we describe the general experimental set-up as well as the two instru-
ments to be tested and we derive the rational5 prediction for these cases. In the
second part, 2.2, we specify the remaining details of the different experimental
treatments.
2.1 General Description and Theoretical Analysis
For our experiment we consider three different versions of the centipede game:
the standard centipede game (henceforth CP-game), a CP-game with insurance
and a CP-game with a bonus option. In the following we explain these treatments
in detail.
5Here and in the following the rational prediction is understood to be the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
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2.1.1 The Standard CP-Game
As a basis for our study, we use the 8-move centipede game depicted in Figure
1, denoted by GS. Different from earlier studies (e.g. McKelvey and Palfrey,
1992; Nagel and Tang, 1998), we use linearly instead of exponentially increasing
payoffs. This choice appears to be better suited for the interpretation of the game
in terms of a joint venture as indicated in the introduction. Also, under linearly
increasing payoffs crazy type explanations for passing (Kreps et al., 1982) are
less plausible.6 The 8-move specification is chosen so as to leave room for gains
which are costly to achieve — given the threat of early termination — while at
the same time avoiding “habitual passing” in the beginning which may occur if
the game is too long.
r r r r r r r r r
r r r r r r r r
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2P P P P P P P P
T T T T T T T T
8
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6
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11
9
9
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14
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17
17
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20
20
18
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
Figure 1: GS. Player 1 (2) moves at nodes xk (xk+1) for k odd and can choose
the actions T (terminate) or P (pass). At each terminal node player 1 (2) obtains
the upper (lower) payoff.
The rational prediction for this standard CP-game, GS, is straightforward.
We state it without proof. The equilibrium concept employed for this as well
as for the other cases is that of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, henceforth
SPNE.7
Rational Prediction (RPS):
In the unique SPNE of GS each player chooses terminate (T) at all her decision
nodes. Hence, the game is terminated at node x1.
6More altruists or crazy types would be needed as the potential gains from matches with an
altruist are lower.
7Incidentally, in GS the Nash equilibrium outcome is unique and coincides with the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.
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2.1.2 The CP-Game with Insurance
In this version the CP-game is extended to a two-stage game. In stage 1 both
players simultaneously decide whether to purchase an insurance at price c (the
exact value of c is specified later). Once both players have decided whether to
buy an insurance or not, they are informed about the decision of the opponent
and the game moves to stage 2, where the CP-game is played. The final payoff for
a player is the payoff obtained in the CP-game minus c, if the player is insured,
plus an indemnity 2 + ε with ε > 0, if the player is insured and the CP-game
is terminated by the opponent. The resulting game is denoted by GI . Figure 2
illustrates the final payoffs for the case where only player 2 is insured. Observe
that the insurance never makes a loss if c ≥ 2 + ε.
r r r r r r r r r
r r r r r r r r
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T T T T T T T T
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8+ε−c
6
11−c
11
11+ε−c
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14−c
14
14+ε−c
12
17−c
17
17+ε−c
15
20−c
20
18−cx1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
Figure 2: Final payoffs in GI for the case where only player 2 is insured.
The potential benefit of the insurance lies in the fact that, once a player is
insured, pass becomes the dominant action for this player at all nodes except
node x8, where it is player 2’s move and 2 optimally chooses terminate even if
she is insured. As the players’ insurance decisions are revealed prior to the play
of the CP-game, purchasing the insurance can be viewed as a credible signal that
the player will pass at all nodes (except x8). The complete rational prediction
for GI is the following (its derivation can be found in the appendix):
Rational Prediction (RPI):
Insurance Decision: If c ∈ (0, ε), then there is a unique SPNE, in which player
1 is insured with probability 1 and player 2 is uninsured. If c ∈ [ε, 9 + ε], then
in any SPNE of GI , either one of the two players is insured with probability 1
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and the other player is not, or both players mix and the insurance is bought with
probability
p∗1 = 1−
c
11 + ε
and p∗2 = 1−
c− ε
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for player 1 and player 2, respectively. If c ∈ (9 + ε, 11 + ε), the unique SPNE is
given by only player 2 buying the insurance. If c > 11+ε there is a unique SPNE
in which no player is insured. Finally, in the knife-edge case where c = 11+ ε, in
any SPNE either no player is insured or only player 2 is insured.
CP-Game: The SPNE-outcomes of the CP-game at stage 2, given the players’
insurance decision, are summarised in Table 1.
Insured Strategies Payoff for 1 Payoff for 2
Both T at x8 17 + ε− c 20− c
Only Player 1 T at x8 17 + ε− c 20
Only Player 2 T at x7 17 17 + ε− c
None T at x1 8 6
Table 1: SPNE-outcomes of the CP-game given the players’ insurance decision.
Here, “T at xk” is to be understood as “P at all nodes xm, m < k, and T at all
nodes xm, m ≥ k.”
2.1.3 The CP-Game with Bonus Option
In the third version of the CP-game, the players’ insurance decision is replaced
by the option to offer the opponent the transfer of a bonus b > 2 which is paid
only in case the opponent does not terminate the game. The size of the bonus is
exogenously given. The offer again has to be decided upon simultaneously and
prior to the play of the CP-game. The bonus offer decisions are observed by both
players before the game moves to stage 2, where the centipede game is being
played. Any offer is binding. The resulting game is denoted by GB; see Figure 3
for an illustration of the final payoffs in the case where only player 1 has offered
a bonus to player 2.
The potential benefit of the bonus option is straightforward. For b > 2,
passing at all nodes is a dominant strategy for both players whenever at least one
9
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Figure 3: Final payoffs in GB for the case where only player 1 has offered to pay
the bonus b if player 2 does not terminate the game.
player has offered the bonus. The complete rational prediction for this version of
the CP-game is given below (see the appendix for a derivation):
Rational Prediction (RPB):
Bonus Decision: If b ∈ (2, 5), the unique SPNE is given by only player 1 offering
the bonus. If b ∈ [5, 12], there are three SPNE: either only player 1 (player 2)
offers the bonus with certainty or both players mix in their bonus decision with
p∗1 = 1−
b
14
and p∗2 =
12− b
7
.
If b ∈ (12, 14), the unique SPNE is given by only player 2 offering the bonus. If
b > 14 no player offering the bonus is the unique SPNE. Finally, in the knife-edge
case where b = 14, in any SPNE either only 2 offers the bonus or no player offers
the bonus.
CP-Game: The SPNE-outcomes of the CP-game at stage 2, i.e. given the players’
bonus offers, are summarised in Table 2.
2.2 Specifications for the Experiment
For the experiment, we implemented three treatments: a standard treatment (an
implementation of GS); an insurance treatment (an implementation of GI with
c = 2.5 and ε = 0.5); and a bonus treatment (an implementation of GB with
b = 2.5). The parameters are chosen such that a player who is insured has the
same incentive to play pass as a player who was offered a bonus: in both cases
the difference in payoffs between immediate termination and termination by the
10
b is offered by Strategies Payoff for 1 Payoff for 2
Both P at x8 20 18
Only Player 1 P at x8 20− b 18 + b
Only Player 2 T at x8 15 + b 20− b
None T at x1 8 6
Table 2: SPNE-outcomes of the CP-game given the players’ bonus offers. Here,
“P at x8” is to be understood as P at all nodes. As before, “T at xk” is to be
understood as “P at all nodes xm, m < k, and T at all nodes xm, m ≥ k.”
opponent at the next node is 0.5. See Table 3 for a summary of the specifications
and the respective rational predictions.
The computerized experiment was conducted at the Institute for Empirical
Research in Economics at the University of Zurich.8 Subjects for the experiment
were recruited among students from the University of Zurich and the Swiss Fed-
eral Institute of Technology Zurich (ETHZ).9 The data for each treatment were
obtained in two separate sessions. In each session there were 20 subjects. Sub-
jects in all treatments were equipped with detailed instructions for the experiment
and had to answer several test-questions before the experiment was started.10 In
order to make sure that all subjects had understood the rules of the game we did
not start the experiment until all subjects had correctly answered all questions.
All subjects in a session, then, were randomly assigned to one of two equally
large groups: the red group, which had the role of player 1, and the blue group,
which had the role of player 2. It was made clear to the subjects that they would
keep their respective label, red or blue, throughout the entire experiment and
that each member of the red group would play the respective CP-game version
exactly once against each member of the blue group. Hence, in each session the
game was repeated ten times, referred to as periods, and no subject ever played
the game against a previous opponent or against the opponent of a previous op-
8The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experimental software z-tree
(Fischbacher, 1999).
9Subjects were recruited with the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
10All supplementary material (instructions, test-questions, questionnaire, etc.) is available
from the authors on request.
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Treatment Parameters Rational Prediction and Payoffs
Standard — Immediate termination at x1 with payoffs = (8, 6)
Insurance ε = 0.5 Three Nash equilibria:
c = 2.5 Only player 1 insured with payoffs (15, 20).
Only player 2 insured with payoffs (17, 15).
Both players mix with payoffs (15, 16.96).
Termination according to who is insured:
Only player 1 or both ⇒ x8
Only player 2 ⇒ x7
No player ⇒ x1
Bonus b = 2.5 Only player 1 offers the bonus.
Permanent passing with payoffs (17.5, 20.5).
Table 3: Overview over the specification for the different treatments and the
respective rational predictions.
ponent. Actual interaction was anonymous. After each interaction, subjects were
informed about the results of all their previous interactions.
After the computer based part of the experiment, subjects were asked to
answer a questionnaire about their behaviour in the experiment as well as about
some general social and risk attitudes. The questionnaire data are reported in
the sequel only insofar as we consider them pertinent to the understanding of the
subjects’ behaviour in the experiment. At the end of each experimental session,
all experimental payoff units earned by the subjects were converted into Swiss
Francs at a rate of 10:1 (i.e. 10 experimental payoff units were exchanged for
CHF 1).11 Table 4 summarizes the duration and average earnings of the subjects
in each treatment.
11CHF 1 is approximately equal to e 0.64 or $ 0.81.
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Treatment Duration (incl./excl. Instructions) Average Payoff (CHF)
Standard 25 Min./8 Min. 15.60
Insurance 55 Min./13 Min. 15.58
Bonus 55 Min./23 Min. 17.60
Table 4: Overview over the duration and average earnings of the subjects in the
different treatments.
3 Results
In the following, we report and discuss the data obtained in each of the three
treatments specified above. Each treatment was conducted with 40 subjects (20
subjects per session, 2 sessions per treatment) resulting in 200 observations per
treatment.
3.1 The Standard Treatment
First, we report the results from the standard treatment which will serve as the
benchmark case for our study.
Data
Figure 4 shows the relative frequencies with which the game terminated at the dif-
ferent nodes, aggregated over all periods. Average CP-game payoffs for subjects
assigned to the role of player 1 (first-mover) were CHF 14.95; average CP-game
payoffs for subjects assigned to the role of player 2 were CHF 16.24.
Different from McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), we do not find any evidence for
learning towards the rational solution over time. The cumulative distribution of
termination in later periods does not dominate the distribution in earlier periods
in the sense of first order stochastic dominance (cf. Figure 5). In fact, median
termination remains quite stable between node x6 and x7. Hence, we can safely
aggregate the data over all periods.12
12Also individually, small variations are rather indicative of experimentation than of (strate-
gic) learning.
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Figure 4: Relative termination frequencies for the standard treatment aggregated
over all periods. Termination at node 9, i.e. x9, is understood to mean that both
players always played pass.
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Figure 5: Cumulative termination frequencies for the standard treatment aggre-
gated over periods 1–3, 4–7, 8–10.
Discussion
The observed termination frequencies are consistent with a simple behavioural
model in terms of level-k thinking (cf. Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995;
see also Ho et. al, 1998; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007a,
2007b). However, as these models are commonly used for the analysis of nor-
mal form games, we need some adjustments to the specific sequential structure
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of the CP-game. In particular, we assume that non-strategic players (level-0),
L0 for short, do not randomise over all available strategies, which is the most
common assumption, but instead always play pass. This all-pass-assumption for
non-strategic L0 players seems plausible as, given the similarity of all pass-take
decisions, playing pass is arguably the best one can do without thinking strate-
gically as termination is costly in terms of foregone payoffs.13 All other players,
then, are assumed to best-respond to finite-order beliefs, where a belief is clas-
sified as being of order k if the respective player expects her opponent to play
a best-reply against a player with a belief of order k − 1. This latter speci-
fication again slightly differs from the literature on level-k thinking in normal
form games where it is commonly assumed that level-k players simply best re-
spond to level-(k − 1) players (e.g. Nagel, 1995). Under the common definition,
however, it would be impossible to distinguish between non-strategic play and a
best-response to a 1st-order belief in player 1’s behaviour at x7 (in both cases
player 1 always plays pass). Consequently, for player 2 one could not distinguish
between best-response play to a 1st or 2nd-order belief at x6 and so on. There-
fore, we prefer our type classification which gives a one-to-one relation between
types and termination behavior; i.e. it ties the level of thinking to the steps of
iterated backward reasoning.
With the above type classification, player 1 with 1st-order beliefs expects
player 2 to pass until the last node and terminate there. Player 1’s best-reply,
then, is to pass until the next but last node, i.e. x7, where she terminates the
game. Similarly, with 1st-order beliefs, player 2 expects player 1 to always pass
and, hence, does not terminate before the last node. By the same token, under
2nd-order beliefs player 2 terminates at x6 since she expects player 1 to terminate
at x7. Analogously, player 1 terminates at x5 under 2nd-order beliefs since he
expects player 2 to terminate at x6; etc. Accordingly, for the 8-move centipede
game considered here, 4th-order beliefs by player 1 already lead to fully rational
behaviour, i.e. immediate termination of the game; see Table 5 for a summary.
From Table 5 we can derive predictions for the termination of the game under
different beliefs of the players. For example, if player 1 has 1st-order beliefs
13This, of course, presumes that both a more detailed differentiation of a player’s own decision
nodes and considerations about the opponent’s behaviour are signs of “strategic” thinking.
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Type Red Blue
L0 all pass all pass
1st-order beliefs x7 x8
2nd-order beliefs x5 x6
3rd-order beliefs x3 x4
4th-order beliefs x1 x2
Table 5: Intended termination nodes according to the order of beliefs for player
1 (red) and player 2 (blue).
and player 2 is either non-strategic, k = 0, or has 1st-order beliefs, we predict
the game to terminate at x7, which corresponds to the peak of the observed
distribution (cf. Figure 4).
We use aggregate termination frequencies in order to assess the percentage
of observed behaviour which is consistent with 1st-,. . . , 4th-order beliefs or with
non-strategic permanent passing. The resulting type-distribution we then take
as a proxy for the degree of rationality of the subjects in the respective roles (red
/ blue) also for later treatments. Of course, in doing so we neglect variations
in individual behaviour over time. However, as we do not find any evidence for
learning between periods (in any of the treatments), we attribute these changes
to occasional experimentation and not to increased rationality. As we will see,
behaviour in later treatments is supportive of this assumption.
To actually determine the average type distribution, we have to deal with
those subjects for whom intended play remains ambiguous because of termination
by their opponent. We assume here that the behaviour of these subjects at
unreached nodes on average would have been the same as observed play at these
nodes.14 The type distribution thus derived is shown in Table 6.
In total, we find that aggregate termination frequencies in the standard game
are consistent with 85.95% of the red and 66.90% of the blue players being non-
strategic, k = 0, or having 1st-order beliefs. This observation is also consistent
14As an example consider the case of the blue player. Of those blue players who reach x8,
60% terminate the game there. Thus, we assume that of those who pass at x6, 60% would have
terminated the game at x8 although not all get that far due to termination by the red player
at x7. 16
Type Red Blue
L0 44.84% 26.76%
1st-order beliefs 41.11% 40.14%
2nd-order beliefs 13.54% 29.09%
3rd-order beliefs 0.51% 2.01%
4th-order beliefs 0% 2%
Table 6: Extrapolated type distribution for player 1 (red) and player 2 (blue).
with the individual data, according to which only 3 out of 20 (8 out of 20)
subjects in the role of the red (blue) player exhibited a termination behaviour
that necessitates more than 1st-order beliefs in more than 3 instances to be
consistent with our model.15
It may seem puzzling that according to Table 6 blue players on average appear
to be more rational, although all participants are randomly drawn from the same
subject pool.16 In fact, there are more red than blue L0 players and more blue
than red players with beliefs of order k > 1; the percentage of red and blue players
having 1st-order beliefs is about the same. Yet, there are two potential rationales
that can account for this particularity in the type distribution. First of all, due
to our choice of type classification, it is likely that we have underestimated the
degree of rationality among red players. In particular, since observed behaviour
does not allow us to distinguish between L0 first-movers and those who best
respond to an L0 second-mover, we assigned both types to the class of L0 players.
However, it may well be that some of the (so classified) L0 players in fact play
pass as a best-reply to an L0 opponent. As a similar argument also applies to
higher-order beliefs, the estimated type-distribution for red players as a whole is
likely to be slightly biased towards lower degrees of rationality if we compare it
to the type-distribution for blue players. Secondly, being less rational in terms of
the order of beliefs used, i.e. exerting less effort in analysing the game, is always
more costly for player 2 (blue) than for player 1 (red). To see this, consider the
15Few instances could be attributed to simple experimentation. We chose 3 as a threshold,
but other choices (2 or 4) would not change the numbers in any significant way.
16This effect can also be found in the data of McKelvey and Palfrey (1992).
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case of non-strategic passing. An L0 red player, passing at x7, still can, and
occasionally will, encounter a blue player passing at x8, i.e. permanent passing
by the red player is a best-reply to an L0 opponent. By contrast, permanent
passing is always a dominated strategy for blue, even if blue plays against an L0
red. Hence, the structure of the centipede game appears to be such that it puts
more pressure on blue players to exhibit a comparably high degree of rationality
in their termination behaviour. On further reflection, the observed differences in
the type distribution, thus, are less surprising. We do not pursue this issue any
further, though, as only the type’s termination behaviour is important for the
ensuing discussion.
3.2 The Insurance Treatment
Next, we report and discuss the results from the insurance treatment.
Data
In 147 out of 200 pairs none of the two players purchased the insurance (cf. Figure
6). Aggregated over all periods, red players insured themselves in 15 out of 200,
blue players in 41 out of 200 cases. In three instances this resulted in both players
being insured. Moreover, only 4 out of 20 red players and 10 out of 20 blue players
used the insurance at least once.17 Thus, the insurance was completely dismissed
by a majority of 26 out of 40 subjects.
Accordingly, aggregate relative termination frequencies (cf. Figure 7) are al-
most identical to the standard treatment; using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-
sample test, we found no significant difference. Also, there is again no clear
evidence of learning towards earlier termination.18
17One of the red players used it in all ten periods though.
18As the learning-towards-Nash aspect is not the focal point of our analysis, we do not report
the respective data in further detail.
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Figure 6: Number of pairs per period where no player, only player 2 (blue), only
player 1 (red), or both players were insured.
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Figure 7: Relative termination frequencies for the insurance treatment aggregated
over all periods.
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Interestingly, despite its infrequent usage, the insurance option did not com-
pletely fail its purpose. In fact, conditional on only one player being insured,
termination has a clear peak at the rational prediction, i.e. at x8 if only player
1 is insured and at x7 if only player 2 is insured (cf. Figure 8). If no player is
insured, termination is centered around nodes x6 and x7, similar to the standard
treatment.
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Figure 8: Relative termination frequencies for the insurance treatment condi-
tional on no player, only player 2 (blue), only player 1 (red), or both players
being insured, aggregated over all periods 1–10.
Yet, due to the occasional too early termination of players (even insured ones),
introducing the insurance option does not pay in terms of payoffs (cf. Table 7).
Average payoff (CHF)
Player
if insured if not insured unconditional
1/Red 14.83 15.16 15.13
2/Blue 15.44 16.19 16.04
Table 7: Average payoffs earned by the subjects in the insurance treatment.
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Discussion
Two results are particularly noteworthy: first, that the insurance option is used so
little; and second, that in most cases it is player 2 (blue) who buys the insurance.
In fact, at least one player is insured for 53 out of 200 pairs only. Moreover, in 41
out of these 53 cases player 2 (blue) is insured and only in 15 cases player 1 (red)
is insured.19 Also, out of the 14 subjects who insured themselves at least once,
10 had the role of player 2 (blue) and only 4 had the role of player 1 (red); 5 blue
players and 2 red players used the insurance more than once. These observations
are in clear contrast to either of the rational predictions for this game; even in
the mixed equilibrium, both players buy the insurance with a probability larger
than 80%.
However, these observations are to a large extent consistent with the belief-
based model introduced in the previous subsection. To see why, assume that
a player buys the insurance only if the expected delay in game termination is
sufficiently large so that she expects a higher payoff compared to the situation
where none of the players is insured. Obviously, in this case the insurance is
worthless for a player with 1st-order beliefs since the opponent is believed to
play a best-reply to a L0 player who always plays pass. Hence, under 1st-order
beliefs the opponent’s behaviour is independent of the own insurance status so
that the insurance is expected to entail a loss rather than a gain. A player
therefore needs at least 2nd-order beliefs in order to realise the potential value
of the insurance. Under 2nd- or higher-order beliefs the insurance is expected to
signal the opponent a change in behavior compared to the case of no insurance,
namely that the insured player always plays pass (if red) or plays pass until the
last decision node and terminate there (if blue). If the opponent best-responds
to this dominant strategy of an insured player, game termination is delayed.
More precisely, an insured red player with at least 2nd-order beliefs expects
her blue opponent to terminate the game at x8. So red obtains a higher payoff
with the insurance than without it; in the latter case she expects the game not to
go beyond x5 (cf. Table 8). A blue insured player with at least 2nd-order beliefs
expects her red opponent to terminate at x7. Without insurance she expects the
game to terminate at x6 under 2nd-order beliefs, at x4 under 3rd-order beliefs, or
19Recall that there are three pairs in which both players are insured.
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at x2 under 4th-order beliefs (cf. Table 8). Hence, only under 3rd- or 4th-order
beliefs the blue player considers the delay in game termination to be sufficiently
large in order to buy the insurance. As regards the non-strategic L0 players, we
assume that they do not buy the insurance as, strategic thinking aside, it offers
no benefit but is associated with a cost (cf. Table 8).
Red Blue
Type
w/o insurance w. insurance w/o insurance w. insurance
L020 all pass (20) all pass (17.5) all pass (18) all pass (15.5)
1st-order x7 (17) x8 (15) x8 (20) x8 (17.5)
2nd-order x5 (14) x8 (15) x6 (17) x7 (15)
3rd-order x3 (11) x8 (15) x4 (14) x7 (15)
4th-order x1 ( 8) x8 (15) x2 (11) x7 (15)
Table 8: Expected termination node without (w/o) and with (w.) own insur-
ance and corresponding own payoffs (including insurance costs and benefits, if
applicable) for red and blue dependent on the order of beliefs.20 Payoffs for the
respective preferable option are in bold type.
Taking the type distribution obtained in the standard treatment as the bench-
mark (cf. Table 6), we thus expect red (blue) players to use the insurance in about
14% (4%) of all instances. According to our data, red players use the insurance
in 7.5% of all cases which is below our prediction. Individually, however, 20% of
the red players use the insurance at least once and 10% use it more than once.
Although the post experimental questionnaire gives few hints at framing effects
(Andreoni, 1995), they nevertheless offer a potential rationale for the comparably
small discrepancy. In particular, the insurance decision, arguably, may have been
prone to negative framing effects, especially for the first-moving red; purchasing
insurance after all may be construed as a lack of confidence in the opponent’s
good will and may thus obliterate any positive appeal to reciprocity due to initial
20As regards the non-strategic L0 players, specifying expectations, of course, is awkward
as any expectation about termination implies some form of strategic thinking. Accordingly,
the “all-pass” expectation specified in the table should not be understood as a “conscious
expectation” but rather as the logical equivalent to the assumed behaviour of L0 in the CP-
game.
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passing. All in all, we think that the observations for red are fairly consistent
with the prediction from the model.
As concerns observed usage frequencies for blue players, these are notably
higher than predicted. In aggregate blue players use the insurance in 20.5% of all
cases and 25% of the blue players use the insurance more than once (prediction
≈ 4%; cf. Table 6). However, the high usage frequencies for blue players can
be explained by two possible mistakes on the part of a blue player with 2nd- or
higher order beliefs. First, a blue player may simply compare the expected game
termination with and without insurance and buy the insurance whenever it delays
the termination of the game. In this case she buys the insurance already under
2nd-order beliefs although her payoff is lower than without insurance due to a
delay by one node only (x7 instead of x6, cf. Table 8). Second, blue may falsely
believe that the red opponent always plays pass if blue is insured. This error may
arise as follows: When contemplating to buy the insurance a blue player with
2nd- or higher order beliefs may argue that the insurance signals the opponent
that he will always play pass, while in fact he will not play pass at the last node.
The red opponent’s best-reply then is to always play pass which means the game
terminates at x8. Hence, under both mistakes the insurance is already valuable
for blue players with 2nd-order beliefs. Including this type in our prediction, we
would expect up to 33% of the blue players to buy the insurance which is indeed
close to what we observe in the data.21
Besides our behavioral model, there is an alternative, more rational explana-
tion for the fact that most subjects do not purchase the insurance. As can be seen
from Table 7, average payoffs were higher for subjects if they were not insured.
Hence, if a subject either has a correct belief about the payoffs to be expected
with and without insurance or if he or she has tested the insurance in some pe-
riods and payoffs were observed to be too low, then it is rational not to buy the
insurance. Also, given theoretical predictions (cf. Table 3), neither player could
increase her expected payoff beyond the empirical mean in the standard treat-
21Note that negative framing effects, as cited above, should only play a negligible role in
case of blue. Not only is the evidence for such effects from the post experimental questionnaire
feeble. If present at all, we also would expect the effect to be less negative for blue as second-
movers are more likely to feel “in need” of an insurance (or may expect to be perceived as
such), given that first-movers eventually can always terminate the game in their favour.
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ment by taking the insurance herself.22 And, indeed, only 5 out of 14 subjects
who insure themselves at least once buy the insurance more than 4 times. In view
of the subjects’ responses to the post experimental questionnaire, however, the
rational explanation for the failure of the insurance is questionable. If subjects
had rejected the insurance option due to optimistic expectations about expected
payoffs in the standard game, they could have reported so in their answers to the
questionnaire. Yet, only one subject comments on the own behaviour in a way
which indicates that the insurance was dismissed due to roughly correct expec-
tations about the outcome without insurance. The majority of subjects instead
indicate that they did not realize that the insurance may delay the termination
of the game which is in line with our behavioural model.
3.3 The Bonus Treatment
Finally, we report the results from the bonus treatment. Recall that in the bonus
treatment, prior to the play of the CP-game subjects could offer their opponent
a bonus b = 2.5 for not terminating the game.
Data
Different from the insurance, the opportunity to offer a bonus to the opponent for
not terminating the game is readily seized (cf. Figure 9). Player 1 (red) offered
the bonus in 133 out of 200 instances, with 19 out of 20 subjects offering the
bonus at least once; 15 out of 20 subjects offered it strictly more than 3 times.
Player 2 (blue) offered the bonus in 66 of 200 instances, with 15 out of 20 subjects
offering the bonus at least once; 9 out of 20 subjects offered the bonus strictly
more than 3 times. Together this resulted in a total of 154 of 200 pairs where
at least one player had offered the bonus. As we can see from Figure 9, in all
periods except the first only player 1 (red) offered the bonus for the majority of
pairs, which is in accordance with the theoretical prediction.
Moreover, in the vast majority of cases, if a bonus offer is made, the CP-game
is terminated according to the rational prediction or even later, i.e. no earlier
than node x8 (cf. Figure 10). Only if no bonus is offered, relative termination
frequencies are centered around nodes x6 and x7 as in the standard treatment.
22We treat the average payoff of 14.95 for the red player in the standard case as equal to 15.
24
02
4
6
8
10
12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Period
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f P
ai
rs
No Player
Only Blue
Only Red
Both
Figure 9: Number of pairs in the bonus treatment, where no player, only player
2 (blue), only player 1 (red), or both players offered a bonus payment.
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Figure 10: Relative termination frequencies for the bonus treatment conditional
on no player, only player 2 (blue), only player 1 (red), or both players offering a
bonus, aggregated over all periods 1–10.
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Accordingly, as the bonus offer is used so frequently, the CP-game is termi-
nated significantly later in the bonus treatment than in the standard or insurance
treatment (p-value ¿ 0.01 in a one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; cf. Figure
11).
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Figure 11: Relative termination frequencies for the bonus treatment aggregated
over all periods.
Finally, for red players payoffs were considerably higher if they offered a bonus
than if this option was dismissed (cf. Table 9).
Average payoff (CHF)
Player
if subject offered bonus if subject offered no bonus unconditional
1/Red 17.68 15.64 17.00
2/Blue 17.37 18.60 18.20
Table 9: Average payoffs earned by the subjects in the bonus treatment.
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Discussion
Our data show that the bonus option is effective in that the bonus is offered by
at least one of the players in 77% of all pairs; in 66.5% (33%) of all possible cases
the red (blue) player offered the bonus. Moreover, if the bonus is offered, the
number of terminations prior to x8, the terminal node, is negligible (11 of of 154
cases, i.e. 7.1%).
These observations are consistent with the previous specification of our belief
based behavioural model. Again, assume that a player offers the bonus if the
expected delay in game termination is sufficiently large such that she expects
a higher payoff compared to the situation where no player offers a bonus. In
this case, all red players with at least 1st-order beliefs will note that offering
the bonus renders permanent passing the dominant strategy for blue (cf. Table
10). Without the bonus, all strategic red players (k > 0; 55% according to our
estimation in Table 6) expect blue to terminate at x8 – at the latest – so that
it is profitable to offer the bonus. For a blue player, by contrast, the bonus is
valuable only under 2nd- or higher-order beliefs (cf. Table 10). With 1st-order
beliefs blue expects red to always play pass even without being offered a bonus.
Thus, only blue players with 2nd- or higher-order beliefs will offer the bonus (33%
according to our estimation in Table 6). Finally, non-strategic L0 players will not
consider offering a bonus to their opponent (cf. Table 10) as it involves a cost
but provides no benefit to them. To see this observe that in order to recognize
the benefit of the bonus, a player has to analyse the opponents’ termination
behaviour, i.e. she has to think strategically which is ruled out for L0 players
by definition. These predictions are indeed close to the observed frequencies for
bonus offers given by 66.5% for red (we predicted 55%) and 33% for blue which
is, incidentally, identical to our prediction. This result also holds true if take into
account potentially positive framing effects in conjunction with the bonus offer
(cf. Andreoni, 1995). In this case, predicted figures for red and blue would have
to be slightly increased; yet again we would expect the increase to be moderate
as post experimental questionnaires give no conclusive hint at the presence of
framing effects.
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Red Blue
Type
w/o bonus w. bonus w/o bonus w. bonus
L023 all pass (20) all pass (17.5) all pass (18) all pass (15.5)
1st-order x7 (17) all pass (17.5) x8 (20) x8 (17.5)
2nd-order x5 (14) all pass (17.5) x6 (17) x8 (17.5)
3rd-order x3 (11) all pass (17.5) x4 (14) x8 (17.5)
4th-order x1 ( 8) all pass (17.5) x2 (11) x8 (17.5)
Table 10: Expected termination node without (w/o) and with (w.) own bonus
offer and corresponding own payoffs (including bonus cost, if applicable) for red
and blue dependent on the order of beliefs.23 Payoffs for the respective preferable
option are in bold type.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed two modifications of the centipede game aimed to
achieve higher aggregate welfare, i.e. later termination. These modifications were
given by an insurance which slightly overcompensates losses due to termination
by the opponent, and by an option to offer a bonus to the opponent for not
terminating the game. Both modifications were designed so as to theoretically
induce passing until (close to) the end once they were utilised. Different from the
bonus option, which is more direct, the insurance banks on a signalling effect as
buying the insurance indicates that the insured player intends to always pass.
Empirically, it turned out that subjects fail to grasp the signalling aspect
of being insured and essentially ignore the insurance option. By contrast, the
bonus, which can readily be interpreted as a price for permanent passing by
the opponent, was heavily used and led to significantly later termination of the
CP-game as compared to the standard version. Thus, the results show that it is
considerably easier for subjects to grasp effects based on strict dominance (bonus)
than effects based on iterated reasoning (insurance).
But more can be said. As we have argued, the results can be rationalised by a
23Cf. footnote 20.
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simple behavioural model based on the assumption that players essentially best-
respond to finite-order beliefs. In particular, the data obtained in the standard
treatment suggest that the majority of subjects choose their strategy based on
beliefs of order at most 1. With such beliefs, however, subjects cannot realise
the signalling value of the insurance, which requires at least two steps of iterated
reasoning for the first and 3 steps of iterated reasoning for the second mover.
Yet, they can grasp the more immediate effect of the bonus. Both the empirical
data and the answers from the questionnaire were shown to be largely consistent
with this argument.
From an applied point of view, our results suggest that mechanisms which
implement a desirable outcome only under higher-order or even rational beliefs
may fail in practice. In this sense, our findings are interesting for applied mech-
anism design since they indicate potential constraints on implementation due to
bounded rationality.
Appendix
Derivation of RPI: The SPNE for the subgame of GI in which players have
already taken their insurance decision are immediate (cf. Table 1 in the text).
Accordingly, we have the following pure strategy SPNE: no player being insured
if c ≥ 11 + ε only player 1 being insured if c ∈ (0, 9 + ε], only player 2 being
insured if c ∈ [ε, 11 + ε].
We now solve for a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. From the above analysis,
it follows that c ∈ [ε, 9 + ε] is a necessary condition for a strictly mixed Nash
equilibrium. Let p∗i be the probability with which player i buys the insurance.
In equilibrium, given p∗j for j 6= i, player i is indifferent between buying the
insurance and being uninsured. Hence, the expected payoff from not buying the
insurance equals the expected payoff from buying the insurance. For player 1 the
former is given by 17p∗2 + 8(1 − p∗2), the latter by 17 + ε − c. Using the above
indifference condition and solving for p∗2, we obtain
p∗2 = 1 +
ε− c
9
.
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Similarly, we obtain
p∗1 = 1−
c
11 + ε
.
Hence, there is a unique strictly mixed SPNE, in which player 1 buys the in-
surance with probability p∗1 = 1 −
c
11 + ε
and player 2 buys the insurance with
probability p∗2 = 1 +
ε− c
9
.
Accordingly, for c ∈ (ε, 9 + ε), there are three SPNE, namely one mixed
equilibrium in which both players are insured with the probabilities just derived,
and two pure equilibria in which one player insures with probability 1 and the
other does not insure. Equilibrium play of the centipede game is according to
Table 1. ¤
Derivation of RPB: Again the SPNE of the CP-game for given bonus offers
are immediate (cf. Table 2 in the text). Consequently, we have the following pure
strategy SPNE: no player offering the bonus if b ≥ 14, only player 1 offering the
bonus if b ∈ (2, 12], only player 2 offering the bonus if b ∈ [5, 14].
For b ∈ (5, 12) there is an additional equilibrium in mixed strategies. Let p∗i be
the probability with which player i offers the bonus. In equilibrium, given p∗j for
j 6= i, player i is indifferent between offering the bonus and not offering the bonus.
For player 1, offering the bonus gives an expected payoff of 20p∗2+(20−b)(1−p∗2),
while not offering the bonus leads to an expected payoff of (15+ b)p∗2+8(1− p∗2).
Using the indifference condition, we obtain:
p∗2 =
12− b
7
.
Similar considerations for player 2 yield
p∗1 = 1−
b
14
.
¤
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